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GEOFFREY CUPIT 
1. The Issue 
It is often said that justice requires equality. Which kind of equality 
justice requires is, of course, a matter of dispute: it is widely held 
that in a just society there must be equality before the law, and 
equality of opportunity; many have claimed that justice requires 
equality of concern for the welfare of each person; and some have 
argued that significant inequalities in the allocation of resources 
must be avoided. And, of course, many believe that justice requires 
public affairs to be conducted through democratic institutions-for 
only such arrangements express an equality of political status, and 
seek to provide an equality of influence. 
If we ask why justice should be thought to require such equa- 
lities, we are likely to be given one (or both) of the following 
responses-one positive, the other negative. According to the 
positive response there is a general requirement to treat people as 
equals; and treating people as equals requires at least certain kinds 
of equality or equal treatment.1 The positive response, then, appeals 
to a general claim: people are to be treated as equals. The negative 
response is content merely to challenge particular assertions of 
superiority-usually the assertions of superiority based on the 
traditional considerations of birth, race, sex, and so on. Such claims 
to superior status cannot be made out-so the negative argument 
goes-and thus it is unjust to treat people as superior or inferior on 
the basis of such considerations. And where there are no relevant 
grounds to discriminate-the argument continues-equal treatment 
is required. 
I want to focus in this paper on the positive response. There may 
be nothing wrong with the negative response as far as it goes. But it 
seems that something will be lost if the positive response cannot be 
sustained.2 I want, then, to examine whether there is any general 
Cf. '... the right to treatment as an equal is fundamental, and the right 
to equal treatment, derivative' (Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 
(London: Duckworth, 1977) p. 227). 
2 The negative response seems, by virtue of its negative and particular 
character, a weaker basis on which to try to defend (any particular) equal- 
ity or equal treatment. First, to the extent that the response merely chal- 
lenges arguments grounding (particular) bases of inequality, it leaves open 
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requirement of justice to treat people as equals.3 I examine two 
approaches. The first attempts to derive the requirement to treat as 
an equal from the claim that we are equal. I argue that this approach 
offers little prospect of success. The second strategy is to try to 
derive the requirement to treat as an equal, not from any equality, 
but from the claim that we are individuals. I shall suggest that a 
3 I focus on this question, and leave aside the question of how, if it is 
indeed necessary to treat people as equals, this is to be done. The question 
of how people are to be treated as equal raises a number of issues, one of 
the possibility that even those bases may be satisfactorily grounded on 
other arguments. Second, in so far as the argument attacks only particular 
bases of inequality, it fails to show that other bases for unequal treatment 
do not remain. (A piecemeal approach to defending equality is always 
liable, in the end, to do no more than justify the replacement of one form 
of inegalitarianism with another-to remove some bases of inequality only 
to leave the field free for the fuller acknowledgment of others.) Third, the 
negative response relies on the claim that where we have no relevant 
grounds to discriminate, equality and equal treatment are requirements of 
justice. Capricious unequal treatment is, on this view, by its very nature, 
unjust. But, to say the least, this is not obvious. (See Norman C. Gillespie, 
'On Treating Like Cases Alike', Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1975) pp. 
151-8.) Why should we suppose that there exists the simple, conceptual 
relationship between equality and justice which is required to make this so? 
Why should we not say that any injustice in unequal treatment stands in the 
same need of explanation as does injustice in treatment in general? Fourth, 
in general we might expect the negative response to require only that we 
avoid treating people in ways that would express (particular) inequalities. 
(We need to include 'in general' here for in some contexts mere avoidance 
may not be enough. In some contexts 'silence' may express.) By contrast, 
if we are positively required to treat people as equals then mere avoidance 
of treating as unequal (together even with the positive expressions 
required by context) may not be enough. Thus the negative response may 
be weak in this further way: a set of practices may avoid treating people as 
unequal (in whatever ways they are not unequal) yet fall short of treating 
people as equals. Thus equalities and equal treatments that may be 
required if it is necessary to treat people as equals, may not be required if 
it is enough that we avoid treating people as unequals. Given the weakness 
of the negative response, then, it seems that something important is lost if 
the positive response cannot be sustained. By accepting this we will be able 
to explain why '[a]lthough most movements for equality can be interpret- 
ed in terms of protests against specific inequalities, a strong disposition 
nevertheless exists, among philosophers and others, to argue that whatev- 
er men's actual differences and whatever their genuine relevance for cer- 
tain kinds of differentiation, there yet remain important values in respect 
of which all men's claims are equal' (Stanley I. Benn, 'Egalitarianism and 
the Equal Consideration of Interests' reprinted in Hugo A. Bedau (ed.), 
Justice and Equality (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971) p. 156. 
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derivation of this kind is more promising. If successful, then, this 
paper will give some support to the view that the proper foundation 
of egalitarianism is individualism. 
Before turning to the arguments I want to make three prefatory 
points. The first concerns how 'equal' is to be understood in the 
expression 'treating as equal'. I shall take equal in this context to 
mean 'being on the same status level', that is, being neither superi- 
or nor inferior. To say that people are to be treated as equals, then, 
is to say that people are to be treated as holding the same rank in at 
least one hierarchy. (It is also to imply that such talk makes sense- 
that it is coherent. We cannot talk of people being equal in status 
and then deny that such talk makes sense.) 
Second, I want to emphasize that I shall be concerned through- 
out only with the question of whether people ought, as a matter of 
justice, to be treated as equals. Thus I set aside what might be 
termed pragmatic reasons. Treating all as equal may be conducive 
to peace and social harmony, giving us the best chance to rub along 
with each other.4 It may provide us with the greatest pool from 
which to draw our friends and lovers-if such relationships presup- 
pose a certain equality of status.5 These may be reasons of a kind to 
treat people as equals; but such prudential considerations provide 
no reason to think that treating people as equals is required as a 
matter of justice. Or so, at least, I shall assume. 
My final introductory point concerns my use of 'egalitarian'. I 
want to consider whether justice requires people be treated as 
equals, and I shall refer to the view that they ought as 'the 
4 For a discussion of some of the social factors which may promote 
egalitarianism see Ernest Gellner, 'The Social Roots of Egalitarianism', 
reprinted in Culture, Identity, and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 
1987). 
5 As has been suggested: 'Although almost every human need can be met 
by superiors and inferiors, the companionship which is the answer to lone- 
liness can come only from equals' (Henry Alonzo Myers, Are Men Equal? 
(Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1955) p. 31). 
which is: how far is equal treatment required in order to treat as an equal? 
In many contexts, preferential treatment seems (to many) not to constitute 
treating as superior-and thus not to constitute a failure to treat as an 
equal. Many of the preferential treatments we give to our friends and 
relatives (such as naming them in our wills) carry no implication of superi- 
ority. Even in contexts where impartial judgment might seem particularly 
appropriate, it is not clear that unequal treatment is always to be 
condemned as a failure to treat as an equal: if all are equally deserving of 
punishment, and some are allowed to go unpunished (by an act of mercy 
or amnesty), it is not clear that such unequal treatment constitutes a failure 
to treat all as equals. 
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egalitarian position'. Now I do think that such a view is properly 
considered to be at the heart of egalitarianism. I take egalitarian- 
ism to be a doctrine about equality and justice; and I take justice to 
be a virtue that requires we treat appropriately.6 But in using 'egal- 
itarian' here I do not mean to presuppose these claims. My interest 
in this paper is not in the nature of egalitarianism, but in whether 
justice requires people be treated as equals. I use 'egalitarian' only 
as a convenient label for a particular response to this question. 
2. The Argument from our Equality 
Why should justice require that people be treated as equals? The 
simplest argument for this claim is: people ought to be treated as 
equals because they are equals. Such an argument has its strengths. 
It seems plausible to say that if people are equals, they ought, at 
least sometimes, to be treated as such. The problem with the argu- 
ment is with its premise. Why should we accept that people are 
equals? To be sure, this claim seems widely endorsed. Yet it is very 
far from being self-evident. Indeed, on the face of it, the claim 
seems highly implausible. People differ enormously. Some are kind, 
thoughtful and tolerant, contributing significantly to the common 
good; others are really quite despicable-malicious, bigoted and 
self-centred, they make no attempt to improve themselves, or to 
return to society any of what they take. Given the many differences 
between people-and their spread along a continuum from the 
wholly admirable to the perfectly contemptible-why should we 
suppose that there is any sense in which they are all equal? 
To be sure we should not exaggerate our differences, and the 
egalitarian may well wish to remind us of our similarities. We all 
feel pain, experience suffering; we all plan our lives, hope, and suf- 
fer disappointments; we all reason, make choices, exercise our free 
wills, and are responsible. It may well be that we have much in com- 
mon, that what distinguishes us from other beings and entities is 
more significant than the differences between us, and that we really 
are all very much the same sort of being.7 But it hardly follows from 
this that we are equal. Our all being human, even if it makes us 
similar, does not make us equal. All carrots are carrots, and all books 
are books: but that is no reason to suppose that there is, therefore, a 
6 For a defence of the claim that justice is to be understood as, at root, 
exclusively concerned with appropriate treatment of this kind see my 
Justice as Fittingness (Oxford University Press, 1996), especially Chapter 1. 
7Cf. Bernard Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', reprinted in Hugo A. 
Bedau (ed.), Justice and Equality, especially pp. 118-9. 
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significant sense in which all carrots are equal, or all books are 
equal. Similarity is not to be equated with equality. An argument for 
equality is thus required. 
The natural way to argue for our equality, it seems, is to argue 
that there is something in which we are all equal-that there is some 
feature or attribute which we all have to the same degree.8 Not any 
attribute will do. First, we must be willing to regard the feature or 
attribute as status-affecting-as relevant to an appraisal of us-if 
we are to be able to offer it as a basis for our equality. Second, we 
must be willing to claim that the attribute affects our status in some 
unusually significant way-if it is to ground the claim that there is 
a fundamental sense in which we are all equal. 
But now the difficulty in arguing for our equality is manifest. 
Given that there are billions of people, it seems reasonable to expect 
variation in all attributes, absurd to suppose that there is anything 
with which we are all equally endowed.9 It seems, then, that we can- 
not expect to base our equality on anything that might vary from one 
person to another. And thus we may be tempted to try to found it 
instead on attributes that cannot possibly vary. We might be tempt- 
ed to say that we are all equally human,'? or all equally unique indi- 
viduals, and thus equals. 
But such an argument tries to have its cake and eat it. To claim 
that we are equally human (say) is to claim that we are human to 
the same extent or degree, and thus to imply that it makes sense to 
talk of degrees of humanity; while, in so far as no evidence or 
argument for our alleged equal humanity is offered or thought 
necessary, the assumption is that it makes no sense to talk of 
degrees of humanity. But we cannot have it both ways." 
8 An alternative is to argue that our equality derives not from within- 
from what is (in some sense) intrinsic to us-but is imposed, or at least 
derives, from without. It might be said, for example, that we are equals 
because God makes it so. (For a discussion of the relationship between 
egalitarianism and theism see Louis P. Pojman, 'A Critique of 
Contemporary Egalitarianism: A Christian Perspective' in Faith and 
Philosophy 8 (1991) pp. 481-504.) 9 And, of course, even if an attribute did not vary, the mere fact that it 
could would be sufficient to make the claim that we are equals into a 
(highly) contingent one. 10 An argument for our equality from our common humanity may, of 
course, be precluded by the requirement that our equality be based on an 
attribute we are willing to regard as status-affecting. We cannot base our 
equality on our humanity per se, unless we are willing to claim that species 
membership is, in itself, status-affecting. 
" It may also be objected that in such an argument equality does no 
work. 'To say that all men, because they are men, are equally men, or that 
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What other moves can the egalitarian make? One is to try to 
found equal status on passing some threshold, or on possession of 
some 'range property'.12 We may not all be equal in rationality or 
intelligence, in our exercise of autonomy, or whatever; but we all (or 
most of us, at least) pass some threshold, fall within some range, and 
on that basis, so the argument goes, are properly to be regarded as 
equals. But such an argument seems wholly ad hoc. From where 
does any threshold get its force? Why should we suppose that our 
status is determined by our passing a particular threshold, whilst 
our possessing more than the minimum required to pass that 
threshold is entirely redundant? And why should we suppose that 
passing a threshold has the kind of fundamental significance associ- 
ated with our supposed equality? 
Another move is to argue, not from any equal actuality, but from 
our equal potentiality. Here it is claimed that we all have the same 
potential-or, at least, the same potential in some significant area, 
such as our capacity for acting virtuously. But such an argument 
faces two areas of difficulty. 
First, we might wonder whether it is reasonable to suppose that 
our fundamental status is determined by our potential (even in some 
significant field). Our potential may never be realized. Can an unre- 
alized potential-say, the capacity to do good we will never actually 
do, or the capacity to realize virtues and qualities we will never actu- 
ally realize-really determine our status in a fundamental sense? Or 
is this to give too much consideration to what we might (in some 
sense) have been, rather than to what we actually are? 
Second, even if it is true that a fundamental assessment of us 
ought to be based on our potential, the egalitarian will still need to 
show that we do all have the same potential (in some significant 
field, at least)-and presumably in a manner which leaves us with a 
12 For an argument appealing to the idea of a range property see John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 508. 
to treat any two persons as ends in themselves is to treat them as equally 
ends in themselves is to import a spurious note of egalitarianism into a 
perfectly sound and serious argument. We may call it, if we like, the argu- 
ment from Equality of Respect, but in this phrase it is the word 
"Respect"-respect for each man's humanity, respect for him as a human 
being-which is doing the logical work, while the word "Equality" adds 
nothing to the argument and is altogether otiose' (J. R. Lucas, 'Against 
Equality' Philosophy 60 (1965), p. 298). But perhaps this is too harsh. It 
might be argued that to say that we are all equally human is to say some- 
thing more than that we are all human: it might be argued that it attempts, 
at least, to give expression to a comparison between us in terms of our 
humanity. 
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tolerably concrete identity. It is hardly possible to believe that we 
have the same intellectual potential. But is it any more plausible to 
suppose that we all have the same potential for virtue? It may seem 
profoundly unfair that, say, our capacity for virtue depends on 
external factors, and not entirely 'on us'. But from its being unfair, 
it hardly follows that it is not so. On the face of it, cats lack the 
capacity most humans have for virtue-and presumably through no 
fault of their own. Why should we not accept that the kind of vari- 
ations in potentialities which we think exist between species, also 
exist within (the human) species-albeit, no doubt, to a lesser 
degree? At the very least, our having an equal potential for virtue 
seems a good deal less evident than our fundamental equality is sup- 
posed to be. 
As we noted, mere similarity seems insufficient to ground a claim 
of equality. What the egalitarian requires, it may seem, is to go 
beyond an assertion of similarity to an assertion of identity. And 
since our differences are so apparent, the argument must be that 
those differences are indeed only apparent. Superficially we may 
appear different, but, so the argument must go, underneath we have 
real selves which are all the same. This is the argument for equality 
from a thin and uniform conception of the self. On such an account 
many of our attributes are stripped from the self, to be viewed as at 
most associated with, rather than constitutive of, the self. By strip- 
ping away our various attributes we get down to our inner core, our 
real selves, our essential being-and that core, so the argument goes, 
is the same for all.13 Our fundamental equality, then, is underpinned 
by our identical identities. 
But there are (at least) two problems with such an argument: the 
conception of the self it assumes; and the kind of egalitarianism it 
implies. The problems with the conception of the self come in a 
number of forms. First, the thin conception of the self seems barely 
coherent. Does the account leave us with anyone to be? Is there 
13 This process of stripping the self may be thought of as the progres- 
sive removal of layers. Perhaps our social roles are the outermost layer. 
Removing this layer requires that I come to see myself as taking on the 
roles of farmer or teacher, say, rather than being, in my true self, a farmer 
or teacher. (Cf. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 
1981) p. 32.) My physical attributes represent another level. My body is 
not to be confused with the real me (so the argument may go), and thus its 
physical attributes need not be viewed as constitutive of me. Finally (per- 
haps) we come to aspects of character such as my generosity or courage. 
These may be seen as having their origins in what has merely happened to 
me, in my coming to have certain genes, or through the nurturing, educa- 
tive, and socialising experiences I have undergone. As such we might view 
them as mere attributes which stand always at a certain distance from me. 
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anything left after all that is contingent has been stripped away? 
Second, we generally suppose that at least some of our dignity 
derives from our unique character; but if we are really all the same, 
that dignity and individuality seems threatened. Third, the account 
seems inconsistent with our self-image. We usually suppose that we 
are able to discover things, and to change things, about our particu- 
lar selves. But we can make discoveries about our individual natures 
only if we have individual natures to discover; we can degrade or 
ennoble ourselves only if our selves are capable of change. For a 
number of reasons, then, the idea that underneath appearances we 
are identical seems unattractive. We have an inclination to view our 
differences as going through to our core. We may be mistaken to 
take this view-but it is not clear that we are. One problem with the 
argument from identity, then, is that it tries to base our equality on 
what is, at best, a highly controversial conception of the self. As 
such it fails to provide that assertion of equality with a sufficiently 
solid foundation. 
Nor, it seems-to anticipate a point I shall make more of in a 
moment-is the egalitarianism that flows from such an account of 
an acceptable kind. Any claim that we are equals worth taking seri- 
ously must be consistent with the fact that there are significant 
respects in which some people are superior to-more admirable, 
more worthy, than-others. It would be absurd to deny that, for 
example, Mandela is the superior of Hitler. We are not to suppose 
that the assertion of our equality exhausts all there is to say about 
our relative status or merits. Even if we are equals, we are also 
unequals. But if that is so, then the argument from identity seems 
in danger of proving too much. If the differences between us are 
mere appearances, then it is hard to see what reason we can have to 
think of some as genuinely superior to others. Thus to assert that 
our real selves are unchanging and identical is to risk producing an 
argument for an absurd kind of egalitarianism. 
It is, then, hard to see on what our alleged equality can be based: 
it is hard to find anything (of a suitable kind) in which we are all 
equal. But even if this problem can be solved, and some suitable 
equality identified, the egalitarian will only have reached first base. 
It will still need to be explained why any particular equality is not 
overwhelmed by our inequalities. The problem is this. If we are 
equal in some things, unequal in others, it seems to follow that all 
things considered we are unequal. But if this is so, how can we claim 
to be fundamentally equal? Why, after all, shouldn't any fundamen- 
tal assessment of us be made on an 'all things considered' basis? But 
if it is made on that basis, how can we avoid concluding that we are 
unequal? 
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There are, in principle, three ways in which the egalitarian might 
attempt to deal with this problem. First, it might be argued that 
there are no attributes relevant to our fundamental status in which 
we are unequal. Given the manifest differences between us, and the 
apparent relevance of some of those differences to (some) assess- 
ments of us, this may seem a tall order. Perhaps the least implausi- 
ble way to defend this position is to argue that there is a level of 
assessment of us that is unaffected by our inequalities. The attrib- 
utes in which we are equal go deeper than those in which we are 
unequal. Hence a genuinely fundamental assessment of us can find 
us equals.14 But such a view is surely unacceptable. Why should we 
suppose that there is a level of appraisal immune to saintliness or 
depravity, a level our virtue or evil cannot reach? Why should we 
deny that our merit or demerit goes right through to our core? Such 
a view would imply that the evaluation-affecting differences 
between Hitler and Mandela go only so far down; that the most pro- 
found assessment of them finds them equals. But that seems an 
absurd thesis-and much too high a price to pay to defend the 
egalitarian position. 
A second strategy is to accept that we have inequalities, but claim 
that they exactly cancel out to equality. But this is even less plausi- 
ble than the first strategy: if we are equal, our equality is not, surely, 
the result of such a stupendously unlikely coincidence. There is 
simply no reason to suppose that all people are all things considered 
equals. Indeed, quite the reverse. 
The third strategy - and the only one worthy of serious consid- 
eration-appeals to the idea of a multiplicity of fundamental assess- 
ments.15 On this view there are a plurality of possible fundamental 
14 We can take this line without endorsing the view that our real selves 
are identical. We may hold that there are differences between our real 
selves but that those differences do not affect our status or worth. 
15 I take it that this is the move typically made by egalitarians at this 
point-and that it (normally, at least) takes the form (in part) of invoking 
a distinction between assessments made on the basis of what we 'are' and 
what we 'do'. We are manifestly unequal in terms of our actions. The egal- 
itarian's claim can only be, then, that we are, nevertheless, in the same sort 
or class of beings, and have the same status in virtue of the kind of beings 
we are. There is no doubt that we do often distinguish between what we are 
and what we do, and that we offer assessments which purport to be based 
exclusively either on our natures, or on our actions (and omissions). And 
the distinction is well marked in our language. The focus seems to be 
exclusively on what a person has done when we make (what we call) a 
'moral' assessment or ranking, and when we allot punishment and reward. 
(It is-or so it seems-appropriate to punish and reward only for what 
people do, not for what they are.) And some have suggested that 'desert' is 
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assessments of us, and at least one of these assessments is based 
exclusively on attributes in which we are equal. On this view, then, 
on at least one assessment we are fundamentally equal for, when 
making that assessment, our inequalities are left aside.16 
The problem with this view is to explain how an assessment can 
be both fundamental in character and restricted to certain parame- 
ters. How can we justify the claim that there is a fundamental 
assessment of us which does not take everything into account? To 
be sure we often do make assessments in terms of some particular 
parameter, or some particular set of parameters, and simply leave 
aside other considerations. This is because we often assess for a 
16 If such a view can be defended then much-if not all-of the sting can 
be drawn from the charge that: 'Since egalitarians are committed to such 
absurd consequences of their position as, for instance, that Stalin or Hitler 
and Einstein or Hume have equal human worth, they should give up their 
position' (John Kekes, 'Human Worth and Moral Merit', Public Affairs 
Quarterly 2 (1988) p. 67). If the egalitarian were committed to such assess- 
ments as the sole fundamental assessment to be made, the egalitarian's posi- 
tion would indeed be absurd. But it is not absurd (at least to those sympa- 
thetic to egalitarianism) to make such an assessment if it is to be understood 
in such a way as not to preclude other (fundamental) assessments according 
to which those compared are unequal. Of course it remains to defend the 
practice of making multiple fundamental assessments. 
appropriately used only when the putative basis of desert is an action, and 
that 'merit' is to be used in cases where the basis is something for which 
we are not responsible. (See, for example, J. R. Lucas, Responsibility 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) pp. 124-7.) This is not to say, however, 
that the distinction is a clear one. In understanding and assessing what we 
are we view ourselves as unchanging-or very largely so. But why should 
we suppose that what we are remains untouched by the actions we per- 
form? Is it not reasonable to say that people who live in a particular way 
are loving or selfish, or just or unjust-that what we do does change who or 
what we are? Is it not a mistake to suppose that (at least many of) our 
actions always stand at a certain distance from us, are never more than 
merely associated with us? The extreme view that we cannot change what 
we are no matter how awfully we act is often rejected: acts of a certain 
gravity are often supposed to put those who perform them beyond a cer- 
tain pale; those who have acted in such ways really are different from the 
rest of us. But if this is so, why is it a mistake to think of more common 
acts as affecting who we are? Why is it a mistake to suppose that who or 
what we are is, in part, constituted by what we have done or not done? 
Again it is not that the use of the distinction between what we are and what 
we do is unreasonable-indeed it is hard to see how we could get by with- 
out it. Rather the point is that here again the argument for treating as an 
equal from our supposed equality seems to rely on a claim which may be 
thought weaker than the requirement to treat as an equal is supposed to be. 
114 
The Basis of Equality 
particular purpose. When we need a good musician or scribe we 
assess people as musicians or as writers, and we rightly leave aside 
many attributes as irrelevant. But such assessments are hardly fun- 
damental. It seems that when we assess people for a particular pur- 
pose our assessment is not fundamental; and when we make a fun- 
damental assessment we are not assessing people for any particular 
use. (And, of course, if we did assess all people for any particular 
purpose, we should not expect to find them equal.) 
Nor can a partial assessment of us as equals be defended by sim- 
ple appeal to a multiple aspect view, or by merely claiming that there 
is a perspective from which our inequalities do not count. Talk of 
aspects or perspectives, if taken seriously, invokes the notion of sub- 
jectivity-or of quasi-subjectivity, at least. But the introduction of 
subjectivity here undercuts the objectivity of the conclusion. Why 
should merely looking equal, when viewed from a particular point of 
view, entail that justice requires we be treated as equals? Justice 
requires that we treat as saints those who are saints (and perhaps 
those who we have good reason to think are saints); but it does not 
require that we treat as saints those who merely exhibit an appear- 
ance of saintliness. 
We need, then, an explanation of how the assessment that we are 
all equal can be both partial and fundamental. It might be thought 
that the incommensurability of different (sets of) attributes can 
serve to justify partial yet fundamental assessments. Suppose there 
is some attribute (or set of attributes) X, in which we are equal, and 
that X is incommensurable with our other attributes. There is, 
therefore, let us suppose, no rational way to compare or combine X 
with our other attributes. It may seem to follow that separate and 
distinct assessments must therefore be made. To be sure, it may be 
admitted, not all assessment and evaluation need be algorithmic. 
There is room for a more 'humanistic' kind of judgment. But, so the 
argument might run, there still needs to be some basis on which 
different considerations are to be combined; and it might be argued 
that such a basis is lacking in this case. 
But there is an objection to such an argument from incommensu- 
rability-when it is offered in a defence of the egalitarian position. 
The argument relies on the existence of a problem which, if the 
premises of the argument are true, does not exist. Suppose, for the 
sake of argument, we accept the existence of X-an attribute (or set 
of attributes) in which we are equal, and which is incommensurable 
with our other attributes. It does not follow that we can not produce 
a ranking which takes account of both X and our other attributes- 
for a ranking based on those other attributes alone is tantamount to a 
'combined' assessment. Ex hypothesi, there are no differences in X to 
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affect the ranking. It seems, then, that mere incommensurability is 
unable to explain why we should suppose there to be a partial assess- 
ment of us according to which we are fundamentally equal. There 
remains, then, a problem for the egalitarian: even if there is some- 
thing in which we are equal it still needs to be explained why it fol- 
lows that we are fundamentally equal-why any equality is not over- 
whelmed by our inequalities in any fundamental assessment of us. 
3. The Argument from our Individuality 
We have sought, unsuccessfully, a basis for our supposed equality. 
There may, of course, be a satisfactory argument for our equality 
that I have overlooked. But it is not encouraging to note that even 
committed egalitarians admit to knowing of no satisfactory argu- 
ment for our equality.17 Suppose we start to doubt that there is any 
plausible argument for the claim that we are fundamentally equal. 
Should we also start to doubt that justice requires people be treated 
as equals? Or can the egalitarian position be defended without 
appeal to the idea that we are all equal? In this section I want to con- 
sider whether this is possible, and whether justice might require 
that people be treated as equals, not because they are equals, but 
because they are individuals. 
The suggestion that there is a link between individualism and 
egalitarianism-and that individualism may underpin egalitarian- 
ism-is hardly novel."8 There is a long tradition of combining the 
values of individualism with equality. One of the doctrines associ- 
ated with individualism is the natural sovereignty of each person. 
We are not born masters and servants, rulers and ruled. All are born 
free; no one may claim natural authority over another. The absence 
1 
'I don't know any way of arguing for [the equal fundamental worth of 
all human beings] ...' (John Baker, Arguing for Equality (London: Verso, 
1987) p. 71). 
18 Lukes, for example, has claimed that 'the principle of respect for per- 
sons, as "ends in themselves", in virtue of their inherent dignity as indi- 
viduals, is at the basis of the ideal of human equality' (Steven Lukes, 
Individualism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973) p. 125). However Lukes 
seems to rest this claim on the argument from what we have in common: 
'respect is equally due to all persons-in virtue of their being persons, that 
is of some characteristic or set of characteristics which they have in 
common-and since, as I shall argue, respecting them requires doing all 
one can to maintain and increase their freedom (and to discriminate 
between them in this regard is to fail to show them equal respect)' (ibid, 
pp. 125-6). But, as we noted earlier, such an argument seems vulnerable to 
the objection that there are significant differences between us. 
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of any natural hierarchy of authority places us all on the same 
level-makes us equals-in the state of nature at least. Descriptions 
of the state of nature have typically been descriptions of individual 
sovereignty, and of equality-as far as authority is concerned.19 
But such equality is distinct from the claim that we are equal in 
fundamental worth; there is no argument yet for our deserving to be 
treated as fundamentally equal. But nor, as yet, is there any argu- 
ment for the claim that individuals are indeed sovereign. And the 
possibility arises, therefore, that in answering the question of what 
makes an individual sovereign, we may provide a basis on which to 
argue for our being treated as beings of equal fundamental worth. 
My suggestion, then, is that if we look at what lies behind the claim 
to the sovereignty of the individual (in the state of nature) we may 
find a ground on which to argue for an equality of wider import. 
Why should we suppose that no individual has a natural right to 
command another? What precludes the more able, say, having a 
duty, and a right, to interfere with, and to direct, the less able? To 
be sure, there are the consequentialist arguments against such inter- 
ference that we associate with Mill. Non-interference, in general at 
least, seems likely (given a certain level of development) to lead to 
the improvement of the individual; and given that individuals have 
the greatest knowledge of their own particular circumstances and 
interests, interference for paternalistic reasons is likely to be 
counterproductive. But what explains why such interference is in 
itself unjust, and irrespective of the consequences? 
One argument for the injustice of such interference is that it is 
only by acknowledging the sovereignty of each individual that we 
respect each person as a separate and independent being.20 Claiming 
19 For example, Locke, in the opening paragraph of Chapter II of the 
Second Treatise, highlights individual independence and equality as fea- 
tures of the state of nature. Locke's argument there is that the state of 
nature is a state of equality since there is 'nothing more evident, than that 
creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same 
advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be 
equal' unless God directs otherwise. Unfortunately Locke's claim that we 
are of the same rank seems to beg the question, while his claim that we are 
of the same species and have the use of the same faculties simply fails to 
address the problem raised by the fact that there are differences between 
us. More recently, Rawls' account of the original position combined inde- 
pendence and equality: Rawls set out to determine the principles which 
would be chosen by 'rational and independent persons in an original posi- 
tion of equality', claiming that, by acting on those principles people would 
'express their nature as free and equal rational beings' (John Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice, p. 252). 
20 An alternative argument is that non-interference is required in order 
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a right to direct others-even in their own interests-fails to keep 
the distance between people which is required in order properly to 
reflect the separation which exists (or is thought to exist) between 
people. And justice-for reasons which, of course, will need to be 
explained-requires the acknowledgment of that separation. The 
doctrine of individual sovereignty derives, on this account, from a 
particular (metaphysical) understanding of who or what we are, and 
how we stand in relation to each other. 
The conception of each person as a (radically) separate being is 
often termed 'atomism'. But the metaphor of atoms seems inappro- 
priate: individualism is a doctrine which emphasizes the dignity and 
worth of each individual; it is scarcely in keeping with such an 
account to compare each individual with a mere atom! A more 
appropriate image is suggested in the following passage: 
It was about forty yards to the gallows. I watched the bare brown 
back of the prisoner marching in front of me. He walked clumsi- 
ly with his bound arms, but quite steadily, with that bobbing gait 
of the Indian who never straightens his knees. At each step his 
muscles slid neatly into place, the lock of hair on his scalp danced 
up and down, his feet printed themselves on the wet gravel. And 
once, in spite of the men who gripped him by each shoulder, he 
stepped slightly aside to avoid a puddle on the path. 
It is curious, but till that moment I had never realized what it 
means to destroy a healthy, conscious man. When I saw the pris- 
oner step aside to avoid the puddle I saw the mystery, the 
unspeakable wrongness, of cutting a life short when it is in full 
tide. This man was not dying, he was alive just as we are alive. All 
the organs of his body were working-bowels digesting food, skin 
renewing itself, nails growing, tissues forming-all toiling away in 
solemn foolery. His nails would still be growing when he stood on 
the drop, when he was falling through the air with a tenth-of-a- 
second to live. His eyes saw the yellow gravel and the grey walls, 
to treat people as the free, autonomous beings they are. But it is not clear 
that such an argument would be sound. Why should we suppose that to 
constrain a person is to treat that person as unfree? (It may treat the per- 
son as unworthy of freedom-but that is a different point, and one which 
raises the issue of why a person should be thought worthy of freedom. At 
that point the appeal to separation may appear.) But even if non-interfer- 
ence is generally required in order to treat people as free and autonomous 
beings, it seems doubtful that interfering to constrain actions which will 
significantly limit the actor's future freedom is inconsistent with a require- 
ment to treat as free. At best this argument seems able to provide only a 
very circumscribed argument for the injustice of coercion. 
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and his brain still remembered, foresaw, reasoned-even about 
puddles. He and we were a party of men walking together, seeing, 
hearing, feeling, understanding the same world; and in two 
minutes, with a sudden snap, one of us would be gone-one mind 
less, one world less.21 
Orwell captures here some of the central strands of an individualist 
understanding of our condition. To be sure we 'walk together'-but 
we are distinct and separate. We come into, and go out of, existence 
discreetly. Our bodies are distinct, and above all we have distinct 
and separate consciousnesses: 'one mind less, one world less'. 
How would conceiving of each person as a separate world enable 
us to explain why justice requires that each person is to be treated 
as having an equal fundamental worth? What is the connection 
between being treated as an individual, and being treated as an 
equal? To answer this question, consider how people are to be 
treated if they are indeed separate worlds, and if justice requires 
that they be treated as such. How is our separation to be expressed? 
In particular, how is an acceptance that people are radically separate 
to find expression when they are assessed or ranked? A first require- 
ment, it seems, is that people must not be assessed exclusively in 
terms of their contribution to ends which are not their own, or 
exclusively in terms of their place in some greater scheme of things. 
We are not to be ranked simply on the basis of the roles we play, or 
as the means or tools to the achievement of others' ends. 
But further, we might argue that treating individuals as separate 
worlds requires that we qualify the comparative assessments we 
make of different individuals, or, at least, that we mark a proper 
hesitation in making such assessments. This is because there is, we 
might argue, a tension between treating people as separate worlds, 
and making comparisons between them. In making an assessment 
of someone by comparing that person with others we, as it were, go 
outside or beyond that particular individual. We give expression to 
this idea when we say (rather impractically) that each individual is 
of infinite worth. In some ways this is a puzzling claim-but it 
seems clear that it is intended to express the idea that individuals 
cannot be valued by going outside the world each is, and to give 
expression to their incomparability. 
The inclination to say that individuals are of incomparable worth 
seems widely experienced-at least by those influenced by the indi- 
vidualist tradition. I want to suggest that we should view this 
incomparability as an expression of our profound separation, as an 
21 George Orwell, 'A Hanging' in Collected Essays (London: Secker and 
Warburg, 1961) p. 11. 
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expression of our status as individuals. And further, I want to sug- 
gest that we should understand the claim that we are to be treated 
as equals as following from the claim that we are to be treated as 
incomparable. 
But, we may wonder, how can this be? How can treating people 
as equal be a way of treating them as incomparable? For surely, the 
obvious objection runs, to say that people are equal is indeed to 
compare them. How can treating as equal be a way of treating as 
incomparable? But there is a reply to such an objection. We may 
agree that we cannot say that people are both equal and incompara- 
ble. But we are not considering the argument that people are to be 
treated as equal because they are equal. We need not, then, claim 
that people are equal. 
Nevertheless, we still need to explain the requirement to treat as 
equal. Why should treating as equal be a way of treating as incom- 
parable; and why should this particular way of treating as incompa- 
rable (if that is indeed what it is) be chosen? The explanation, per- 
haps, is this: the point of treating people as equal is to act as a par- 
tial denial of-and thus to serve to qualify-the other comparisons 
we make and express. We say, rightly, that people are unequal-we 
say, rightly, that Mandela is superior to Hitler. Notwithstanding any 
inclination to view individuals as incomparable, justice requires no 
less. But (so the argument goes) justice requires that we treat each 
individual as a separate world. Given that justice requires that we 
make and express comparisons, we can hardly express our incom- 
parability directly, that is, by eschewing the making and expression 
of comparisons. And thus we are forced to express our incompara- 
bility indirectly: we have no choice but to treat people as both 
unequal and equal, and by this equivocation to express their incom- 
parability. In summary: we recognize that people are unequal, and 
must be treated as such; but we must also treat people as equals, not 
because they are equal, but in order to qualify the comparative judg- 
ments we express, and thereby treat each individual as a separate 
world.22 
22 If an argument of this kind is indeed the basis for the egalitarian posi- 
tion then that position is to be seen as, in an important sense, a negative 
one-though it is not the simple negative position noted at the outset. The 
point at which it negates is more fundamental, though the conclusion it 
reaches is more positive. The present argument goes beyond simply deny- 
ing that certain sorts of bases (sex, race, birth, and so on) are relevant to 
an appraisal of us; it denies-albeit in a partial and equivocating fashion- 
the very practice of comparative appraisal. But the conclusion-the claim 
that justice does indeed require that (at least sometimes) we be treated as 
equals-is more positive than the mere rejection of certain bases for 
unequal treatment. 
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As we have noted, a premise of this argument is the claim that 
justice requires each individual be treated as a separate world. But 
why should we accept that claim? The assertion of our separateness 
has, of course, been a feature of much recent liberal philosophy. In 
arguing against utilitarianism and for the inviolability of each per- 
son, Rawls and Nozick famously appealed to this idea, claiming that 
our separation must be taken seriously and respected.23 But even if 
we accept that we are separate and distinct (in some relevant sense) 
it still needs to be explained why this separation is morally signifi- 
cant. Even if we are separate, why is it wrong-indeed, why is it 
unjust-to treat us as if we are not?24 
The problem here is this. To treat people as other than they are 
is sometimes unjust. People who are generous should not be treated 
as mean; people who are brave should not be treated as cowards. 
Such treatment is unjust because it is derogatory. But not all treat- 
ment of people as other than they are is derogatory. It is-or so we 
usually suppose-not derogatory (and therefore not unjust) to treat 
blue-eyed people as brown-eyed, or vice versa. 
Why is it unjust to treat a generous person as mean, but not 
unjust to treat a blue-eyed person as brown-eyed? The difference, it 
seems, is that our generosity and bravery are relevant to an assess- 
ment or evaluation of us, whereas our eye colour is not. Generosity 
and bravery are virtues-we are superior if we have them. Eye 
colour does not-or, at least, should not-affect our standing, our 
status. As a consequence, treating blue-eyed people as brown-eyed 
is not derogatory. 
We can now see the problem faced by anyone who wants to claim 
that justice requires that we take seriously the separation between 
people. Separateness seems too much like eye colour, and not 
enough like a virtue. Our separateness seems not to be relevant to an 
evaluation of us; it is not easy to see why we should suppose that 
23 
'Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between per- 
sons' (John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 27); and 'There are only indi- 
vidual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives. 
Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits 
the others. Nothing more. ... To use a person in this way does not suffi- 
ciently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, and 
his is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from 
his sacrifice, ...' (Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1974) p. 33). 
24 Cf. 'Although [Rawls] seems firm in his view that to each individual 
human being there corresponds exactly one 'system of desires', he never 
says why this must be so, or what exactly a 'system of desires' consists in, 
or why it is wrong to conflate them' (Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the 
Limits of Justice, p. 167, emphasis added). 
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mere separateness makes a being superior, gives it a higher status 
than it would otherwise have. On the face of it, treating a separate 
being as not separate is not derogatory. Why, then, should we sup- 
pose such treatment unjust? 
There are a number of possible responses to this problem. We 
might try to argue that our separateness does indeed make us supe- 
rior, or that treatment can be unjust without being derogatory.25 I 
shall not examine those lines of argument here. My inclination is to 
try to explain the injustice of failing to treat a separate being as 
separate, by invoking the notion of completeness. 
The view that we are each a complete whole-that we are not, 
contrary to the myth related by Aristophanes, each of us 'the mere 
broken tally of a man'26-is an important component, arguably even 
the central claim, of individualism. According to Anthony 
Arblaster, it is a view which arises at a particular historical juncture: 
'Until the later medieval period it was usual to see human beings as 
incorporated in the natural and supernatural worlds. ... Wholeness 
and completeness belonged to the community, the polis, not to the 
separate human being ...,.27 
What does it mean to say that we are each whole and complete in 
this context? It is not to say that we are in every sense complete. It is 
not to deny, for example, that we may develop some aspects of our- 
selves to the exclusion of others, that we may be one-sided-not 
rounded-individuals. Nor is it to deny that there are many ways in 
which we are dependent upon others. The relevant sense of whole- 
ness here does, it seems, require that we are able to give a significant 
description of ourselves which does not require reference to that 
which is other than ourselves. But it must also, surely, be one that 
allows for a synthesis with membership. It must be possible for us 
to be complete in the sense required, and still a constituent member 
of a social union. What is excluded is the possibility that we are, or 
25 Feinberg claims that false judgments can be unjust without being 
derogatory: 'A false judgment or belief about a person is unfair to that 
person if either it is truly derogatory of him or else it severely misrepre- 
sents him in a way which is fundamental to his own conception of himself' 
(Joel Feinberg, 'Noncomparative Justice', The Philosophical Review 83 
(1974) p. 337). But whatever the merits of widening unfair judgments 
beyond the derogatory to include fundamental misrepresentation, it seems 
that such widening will not satisfactorily explain the (alleged) injustice of 
treating the separate as non-separate-for, I take it, even those who (mis- 
takenly) believe themselves not to be separate are treated unjustly if they 
are not treated as separate. 
26 Plato, The Symposium, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951), p. 62. 
27 Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984) p. 22. 
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might become, mere parts of a society or tribe, mere bits of some 
greater social union, mere members of the human race, mere frag- 
ments of the universe. (There is, then, no reason to suppose that an 
attempt to base egalitarianism on individualism can appeal only to 
liberals, and that socialists must look for a different ground. 
Socialists may avail themselves of an individualist under-pinning of 
equality providing only that socialism is taken to require a synthe- 
sising of (rather than, at best, a trade-off between) the values asso- 
ciated with individualism and community.) 
Suppose that each individual is indeed complete-in whatever the 
requisite sense of completeness is here. How does this explain the 
injustice of failing to treat individuals as separate beings? There are 
two points to be made. First, completeness, unlike separateness, does 
seem relevant to assessment and evaluation. So, at least, it is gener- 
ally supposed. We suppose that being whole gives a being a certain 
status over that which is a mere part. Why this should be so is 
beyond the scope of this paper; but it seems plausible to suppose that 
at least part of the explanation invokes the idea that what is whole 
has, in some important sense, an independence, and that to be inde- 
pendent is to avoid a certain kind of fragility. Second, it seems that 
there is a relationship between completeness and separateness such 
that, in order to treat a being as complete it is necessary, in general 
at least, to treat that being as separate. Why should this be so? What 
is the relationship between completeness and separateness? 
Separation does not imply completeness. There seems no reason 
to suppose that what exists in isolation need be anything more than 
an incomplete fragment. Similarly completeness seems not to imply 
separation. There seems no reason why what is complete may not be 
inextricably bound up with that which is other. Nevertheless, there 
seems to be a significant connection between the two notions, albeit 
not one of strict implication. There seems to be an expectation 
that-unless we have reason to think the contrary-what is separate 
from a thing is not required by that thing for its completion; and an 
expectation that-again unless we have reason to think the con- 
trary-what a thing is not separate from is required by that thing for 
its completion. Given that this is so, it seems reasonable to say that, 
at least normally, to treat a being as complete it is necessary to treat 
it as separate. 
My suggestion, then, is this: if we can show that each one of us 
is (in a relevant sense) complete, and if we can show that, ceteris 
paribus, a being which is complete is superior to one which is not, 
then we will have shown that it is unjust to fail to treat us as com- 
plete. We will then have an explanation of why-if the arguments 
I have sketched are sound-it is unjust to fail to treat us as separate, 
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and thereby an explanation of why justice requires that people be 
treated as equals. And, since this argument does not require us to 
hold that people are equal, we may endorse the egalitarian position 
without being embarrassed by our inability to explain on what such 
equality is supposed to be based, or how such equality is not under- 
mined by our manifest inequalities. Our inability to justify the 
claim that all people are equal does not preclude our giving a ratio- 
nal justification for the claim that justice requires that all people be 
treated as equals-with whatever this implies. Of course I have not 
argued that we are complete, or, at any length, that completeness 
does confer superiority-and these claims certainly do require 
argument.28 But they are not, I suggest, so implausible as to make 
28 One reason why we should require argument for the claim that we are 
complete is that it is just not obvious. Another stems from the fact that there 
is reason to think that the belief that we are complete is, in the modern 
world at least, a comforting one. And if it is comforting then perhaps we 
should not be surprised if the belief is widely held, even if it is false. Why 
should the belief be thought comforting? If Arblaster is right, the view that 
individuals are complete arrives at a time (amongst much else, of course) of 
expanding horizons, and perhaps there is a connection here. While we have 
only a local knowledge and local associations, a belief in the significance of 
our own particular lives may sometimes be strained, but we may seem in no 
great danger of having our existences rendered utterly absurd. But as our 
understanding of what we are a part of grows, and as we discover the stag- 
gering enormity of what we are a part of-the age and size of the universe- 
we can hardly fail to be overwhelmed by the utter triviality of our own exis- 
tences. Perhaps we ought to respond by accepting that we (ourselves and 
others) are indeed but trivial fleeting associations of a few of the atoms that 
make up the vast cosmos-utterly infinitesimal, utterly insignificant. But if 
this is profoundly disquieting-as indeed it is-we might be tempted to try 
to deal with our awe at 'the starry firmament above' by looking within, and 
by asserting that there is a world which begins and ends with each of us. 
The assertion of our own completeness is, we might say, one way to keep at 
bay the fate of being swallowed by a whole so large as to mock all our pre- 
tensions to significance, and more besides. (To be sure, there may be no rea- 
son in principle why we cannot see ourselves as less than worlds, less than 
complete, but as significant parts of worlds less than the cosmos. But it does 
seem that once we see ourselves as less than complete, we take a step down 
a slope to insignificance. If we cannot hold the line at the boundaries of our 
own consciousness, there may seem still less hope-in the modern world at 
least-of finding a defensible boundary further out.) It seems possible, 
then, to offer a psychological explanation of why we might incline to a belief 
that we are each a complete world: when we do not have the sense to avert 
our gaze from the enormity of what surrounds us, conceiving of ourselves 
as complete may provide a vestige of comfort. If this is so, and if we wish 
to endorse only beliefs which are true, we should insist on an argument for 
the claim that we are complete. 
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an argument for equal treatment, grounded on our status as 
individuals, unworthy of serious consideration.29 
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